We report a pseudo-outbreak of Aspergillus niger that followed building construction in our clinical microbiology laboratory. Because outbreaks of invasive aspergillosis have been linked to hospital construction, strategies to minimize dust in patient care areas are common practice. We illustrate that the impact of false-positive cultures on patient care should compel laboratories to prevent specimen contamination during construction.
0.73 per 100,000 specimens in the preceding 9 months (RR, 10.82; CI 95 , 1.28 to 887.92; P ϭ 0.005) (Fig. 1) . Initially, we heard of this potential outbreak as A. niger was being isolated from patients in the intensive care unit for whom the pretest probability of infection was high; these included three neutropenic patients, two bone marrow transplant patients, and three solid organ transplant patients. We discovered, however, that A. niger was also being isolated from patients with no recognizable risk factors for IA, including one patient whose urine specimen was collected during a routine obstetrical evaluation. We initiated an investigation in order to determine the etiology of this increased rate of isolation of A. niger from clinical specimens.
Using standardized definitions of nosocomial pneumonia, invasive pulmonary aspergillosis, disseminated extrapulmonary aspergillosis, and local extrapulmonary aspergillosis (4, 13), we reviewed all cases to determine if the patients were infected with A. niger and whether the infections were nosocomial. No inpatients met our criteria for a definite case of nosocomial IA, either pulmonary or extrapulmonary. One inpatient was initially classified as possibly infected because he had a positive culture and a compatible clinical syndrome. We determined that 14 inpatients were unlikely to be infected because they (i) had no clinical manifestation of disease, (ii) went untreated without adverse sequelae, or (iii) had a dedicated fungal culture that was negative.
We discovered that nine patients had specimens that were split at the point of collection, with one part going directly to the mycology laboratory for fungal culture while the remainder was sent to the main microbiology laboratory for bacterial culture. When specimens were split as such, A. niger was isolated from the portion processed in the main microbiology laboratory but not from the portion plated explicitly for fungi. We concluded that either patient colonization or contamination occurring during collection and transport of specimens was an unlikely explanation for the increased number of positive cultures being reported.
We conducted a series of experiments in the microbiology laboratory to investigate possible sources of contamination with A. niger. We noted that many of the positive cultures (12 of 26, 46%) were from specimens plated on buffered charcoal yeast extract (BCYE) medium, the medium that is routinely used in our laboratory for isolation of Legionella spp. Unlike standard blood plates that are held for 48 to 72 h, BCYE plates are held for 7 days, allowing additional time for growth of A. niger. We suspected that growth was detected on BCYE agar because these plates were held longer than the standard blood plates, but we also considered that A. niger may grow preferentially on BCYE medium due to nutrients in the BCYE medium (5 To evaluate the integrity of the central microbiology laboratory BSC, six settle plates were placed in the back of the BSC while the cultures in experiment 2 were being done. Three BCYE plates and three blood plates were left open for 5 min to approximate normal processing time. The plates were incubated and checked daily for growth. On the 4th day, a black mold, which was later identified as A. niger, was present on one of three BCYE plates.
Experiment 4. Next, we inspected the central microbiology laboratory BSC, which is the standard receiving point for all specimens entering the bacteriology section of the microbiology laboratory. We noted a fine black dust on the interior ceiling of the BSC, on the vortex machine that was inside the BSC, and on the BSC floor beneath the vortex machine. Laboratory personnel denied using a Bunsen burner or other sootproducing device inside the BSC that could explain the black dust. Using a sterile swab, we took specimens from all three locations, plated them directly on Sabouraud-dextrose agar slants, and incubated them at 34 to 37°C in the mycology laboratory's incubator. The mycology laboratory is physically separated from the main microbiology laboratory. After 1 week, A. niger grew from two of three specimens.
Experiment 5. While inspecting the area around the BSC, we found that the medium plates stored on the laboratory bench immediately adjacent to the BSC were dusty. BCYE plates were not kept in the area adjacent to the BSC; therefore, we did not suspect that the medium was contaminated prior to specimen processing. The ceiling tiles above the medium plates were dusty as well, and a culture of one of the ceiling tiles grew A. niger.
As a control measure, the central processing area of the microbiology laboratory was thoroughly cleaned. We discovered that the BSC had been installed and certified in May 1996; it was not due to be inspected again until November. Given our findings, laboratory personnel disassembled and cleaned the BSC with Wex-cide (0.026% o-phenylphenol, 0.023% o-benzyl-p-chlorophenol, 99.951% inert ingredients) solution. According to their report, the bottommost panel of the BSC was covered with a black material, but unfortunately no cultures were taken. After the BSC was cleaned, BCYE plates were again placed in the BSC for 5 to 10 min during specimen processing. After 7 days of incubation, there was no growth on any of these plates. Although the BSC was disassembled and cleaned in October, there were six more reports of A. niger through the next month. In November, the BSC failed its filter inspection, and the high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters were replaced approximately 4.5 years before their predicted life expectancy of 5 years. After the visibly dust-clogged HEPA filters were replaced, the pseudo-outbreak was terminated.
While inquiring about the BSC installation, we learned that other construction had occurred in the laboratory in the early summer months. After the BSC was installed in the laboratory in May, a project was started in July to revise the ventilation system for the pediatric clinic, which is situated one floor below the microbiology laboratory. A new ventilation duct, extending from the pediatrics clinic through the microbiology laboratory, was installed immediately adjacent to the BSC. To construct the new duct, workers used jackhammers to remove a 6-by 6-ft area in the ceiling. The workers used the ceiling area directly over the specimen processing bench and immediately adjacent to the BSC as a "crawl space." No barriers were erected to minimize dust production in the laboratory, and specimen processing continued as usual throughout the time of construction. Specimens were plated in the BSC with HEPA filters running as usual.
This apparent breakdown in a pragmatic approach to prevention of contamination highlighted the need for standardized written instructions for the BSC. Procedures prior to this episode covered routine decontamination of work surfaces and annual recertification, filter, and airflow checks of the BSC. There had been no evidence that the HEPA filters were not functioning properly prior to the pseudoepidemic. As a result of this investigation, the laboratory supervisor wrote a set of operating instructions to address the cleaning and maintenance of the BSC beyond routine surface decontamination and required annual certification of filters and airflow. We found that the Manual of Clinical Microbiology (8a) did not offer specific guidelines for microbiology laboratories undergoing construction; therefore, we developed recommendations to be used in our laboratory whenever future construction activities are planned (Table 2 ). With assistance from the manufacturer, we developed specific recommendations for handling the BSC and HEPA filters when dust-generating activities are anticipated (Table 2) .
Like other pseudoepidemics in which true clusters of false infections are identified, our false-positive cultures did not correlate with our patients' clinical conditions (2) . Like the pseudoepidemic described by Norden, in which seven patients were unnecessarily treated for presumed Escherichia coli bacteremia, our false-positive cultures also generated unnecessary procedures, treatments, and consultations. For example, six patients were prescribed antifungal medications. Additionally, these "positive" reports generated six consultations: three to the infectious diseases service and one each to the renal, allergy, and pulmonary services. Multiple laboratory studies were required either to clarify the diagnosis (e.g., Aspergillus serum precipitins) or to monitor side effects of therapy (e.g., renal function tests when amphotericin was prescribed). One 14-year-old patient was asked to return for a repeat lumbar puncture due to reported growth of A. niger from her CSF specimen. We found one other reported pseudoepidemic of aspergillosis, which was traced to blood culture bottles that had become contaminated while stored in the same room as Aspergillus isolates. In that pseudoepidemic, at least 12 patients were treated unnecessarily with amphotericin B (15) .
Since true outbreaks of nosocomial aspergillosis are much more devastating, recommendations for protecting the most immunocompromised patients include use of special air filtration units, periodic reviews of air handling systems, periodic air sampling, and closing of doors and windows to prevent circumvention of the air filter system (14) . Because a significant amount of dust is generated during construction activities, specific measures for minimizing dust during construction have been proposed. Pannuti recommends isolating construction sites with airtight plastic or drywall barriers, using negativepressure ventilation in the work area, decontaminating the area thoroughly after construction, and using a fungicide on construction material that is potentially wet or nutritive (11) .
Fortunately, our outbreak was due to specimen contamination rather than infection with Aspergillus. We propose that methods such as those used to protect patients from potential exposure to Aspergillus conidia be modified for use in the laboratory. When specimens are not protected from construction dust or its remnants, they can easily become contaminated. If the patients from whom these specimens are collected are immunocompromised, it can be particularly difficult to elucidate whether they are infected or not; therefore, unnecessary testing and treatment may ensue. If we can eliminate false-positive cultures by protecting laboratory specimens, then unnecessary costs, procedures, and potential complications can be spared.
In summary, we investigated and terminated a pseudoepidemic of A. niger cultures that we traced to specimen contamination in the microbiology laboratory during construction. Because false-positive cultures impact patient care, laboratories should be prepared to institute precautions to protect clinical specimens during dust-generating activities such as building construction.
